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ABSTRACT
During the summer of 2018, Facebook, Google, and Twier created
policies and implemented transparent archives that include U.S.
political advertisements which ran on their platforms. rough our
analysis of over 1.3 million ads with political content, we show how
dierent types of political advertisers are disseminating U.S. polit-
ical messages using Facebook, Google, and Twier’s advertising
platforms. We nd that in total, ads with political content included
in these archives have generated between 8.67 billion - 33.8 billion
impressions and that sponsors have spent over $300 million USD
on advertising with U.S. political content.
We are able to improve our understanding of political advertisers
on these platforms. We have also discovered a signicant amount
of advertising by quasi for-prot media companies that appeared
to exist for the sole purpose of creating deceptive online communi-
ties focused on spreading political messaging and not for directly
generating prots. Advertising by such groups is a relatively re-
cent phenomenon, and appears to be thriving on online platforms
due to the lower regulatory requirements compared to traditional
advertising platforms.
We have found through our aempts to collect and analyze this
data that there are many limitations and weaknesses that enable
intentional or accidental deception and bypassing of the current
implementations of these transparency archives. We provide several
suggestions of how these archives could be made more robust and
useful. Overall, these eorts by Facebook, Google, and Twier have
improved political advertising transparency of honest and, in some
cases, possibly dishonest advertisers on their platforms. We thank
the people at these companies who have built these archives and
continue to improve them.
1 INTRODUCTION
Online advertising plays an increasingly important role in polit-
ical elections. As part of the 2016 U.S. national elections there
were a number of controversies regarding an ad-driven propaganda
campaign to inuence elections [4] and privacy violations [12]. In
response to these controversies, Facebook, Google, and Twier
have all created policies and implemented products to make trans-
parent and archive U.S. political advertisements that have run on
their platforms. A report by Upturn points out in their analysis of
Facebook’s then-proposed political transparency archive plans that
providing eective transparency of only political ads can be tricky
in the face of a complex online ad network [31].
In this paper, we analyze Facebook [5], Google [11], and Twit-
ter’s [29] political ad transparency implementations along with the
political ad data included in each archive. rough the lens of these
transparency eorts, we perform what is to our knowledge the rst
large-scale analysis of U.S. online political advertising. Our analysis
enables us to begin to understand and describe the parts of online
political advertising in the U.S. that have been made accessible and
transparent. We collected as much data as was possible from these
archives, collecting 75% of ads archived by Facebook and 100% of
ads archived by Twier and Google from May, 2018 – October 21st ,
2018. In total, we collected and analyzed over 1.3 million politi-
cal ads from over 24 thousand sponsors. We additionally connect
this data to a public dataset published by ProPublica which was
gathered by Facebook users via a browser plugin. e ProPublica
dataset provides partial information on how Facebook ads have
been targeted to the user seeing them.
Our analysis was hampered by our inability to collect all of the
ads in Facebook’s transparency archive due to limitations of their
current beta API. It was also hampered by Facebook and Google
releasing ranges instead of exact impression data. It is also unclear
if spend is the best metric for measuring the impact of an online
political advertisement. us, there is some level of uncertainty in
much of our analysis especially that related to Facebook’s platform.
We acknowledge that all three of these political advertising trans-
parency archives were rapidly deployed and this has caused some of
the issues with what and how it was released. We have worked with
Facebook to improve access to the ads in their transparency archive
and we hope to work with Google and Twier so that they can
include more political advertisers in their transparency archives.
Given these limitations and biases of our data, we perform an
initial large-scale analysis of U.S. online political advertising. As
part of this study, we provide information about the audience size
of individual political ads based on impression data for each of
the platforms. We nd that across all three platforms the majority
of political ads are small, costing their sponsors less than $100
USD with 82% of all Facebook political ads costing between $0 -
$99. is conrms and quanties the prevalence of small likely
highly targeted ads that can contain custom political messaging.
We also create a taxonomy of political ad types based on their
intent (i.e., connect, donation, inform, move) and an eective ad
type classication methodology based on labeling URLs included
in political ads. Using our methodology, we are able to provide a
longitudinal analysis of political ads based on the type of ad. Finally,
we are able to identify many likely dishonest advertisers that are
not correctly disclosing or are obfuscating the real ad sponsor. We
categorize these types of advertisers into quasi for-prot media
companies and corporate astroturfers. We discuss the limitations
and weaknesses that enable intentional or accidental deception and
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bypassing of the current implementations of these transparency
archives. Based on our experiences analyzing these transparency
archives, we provide several suggestions of how these archives
could be made more robust and useful.
We have made as much of the data that we have collected as
possible public as well as all of our labeling, data collection, and
analysis scripts public. Our initial reports have been the basis for
many journalists’ stories which have improved online political
advertising transparency.
2 BACKGROUND
Facebook, Google, and Twier have all deployed political advertis-
ing transparency archives. However, each of these transparency
archives have dierent criteria for the inclusion of ads and dierent
modes of access which we create a taxonomy of in Table 1. Each
of these transparency archive implementations has strengths and
weaknesses and there is currently no “best” archive.
Facebook Google Twier
Ads All Candidates, Federal Federal
Included Issue ads candidate candidate,
related Issue ads
Sponsor Name Name, Name,
Info FEC/EIN billing info
Ad Contents Ranges Ranges Exact
Viewed Gender, age, N/A Gender, age,
Audience geolocation geolocation
Targeting N/A Age, gender, Age, gender,
Info geolocation geolocation
keywords
Data Portal, Portal, Portal
Availability API (w/NDA) Database API
Table 1: Transparency Implementations
What is an ad? For purposes of this study, an ad is a record in
an archive with a unique id assigned by the platform. While each
platform has slightly dierent information associated with each
record, each has 3 categories of information associated with it:
content, context, and results. e contents of an ad consist of any
text, images, and/or videos seen by an ad viewer. e context of the
ad is the information specied by the advertiser about how, when,
where, and by whom they want the ad to be seen and how much
they are willing to spend for the ad to be seen. Both the content
and context of the ad are specied by the advertiser at the time
of ad creation. e results of the ad consist of information about
who ultimately interacted with the ad and when those interactions
happened, and how much was ultimately spent on the ad. Not all
of this information is made available about each record in any of
the archives, but all of this information is made available by at least
one archive.
Archive Completeness. All archives contain a unique id for each
ad, impression counts and amount spent for each advertisement, as
well as the dates the ad was active. Facebook and Google release
ad impression and spend in ranges and Twier releasing these as
exact numbers. Twier’s implementation of releasing exact im-
pression and spend information from every ad enables us to more
precisely measure political advertising on their platform. It would
help remove uncertainty if Facebook and Google would also release
exact ad impressions and spend amounts instead of ranges. We
also note that impressions is an imperfect metric to measure the
“reach” of an ad and it would be useful to also include click and
other interaction metrics recorded by the platforms. Facebook and
Twier includes the ad text, image, and video content; Google’s
archive contains a link to a webpage where this content is view-
able, but does not contain the content itself. Twier is the only
platform to release targeting information, including whether users
were targeted by geography, age, or gender. Facebook and Google
have detailed information about how users are targeting for each
ad, based on advertiser produced lists of personally identiable
information, groups they belong to, demographic or income infor-
mation that the platform has about the user, geography, or keyword
search information, however they do not currently make any of
this information available in their archives.
Ads Included. Facebook has themost inclusive policy and includes
in their archive ads that meet any of the following criteria: “(1) Is
made by, on behalf of, or about a current or former candidate for
public oce, a political party, a political action commiee, or advo-
cates for the outcome of an election to public oce; (2) Relates to
any election, referendum, or ballot initiative, including ”get out the
vote” or election information campaigns; (3) Relates to any national
legislative issue of public importance in any place where the ad is
being run; [8] (4) Is regulated as political advertising.” [7] Facebook
allows advertisers to opt into including their ads in the archive. In
order to enforce their policy, Facebook uses a combination of user
reports and machine learning algorithms to “catch” political ads
where the sponsor did not opt into making them transparent.
Google is only including ”ads related to elections or issues that
feature a federal candidate or oceholder” [11]. Google has stated
that they plan on expanding the set of ads included in their archive.
It is unclear how Google enforces their policy.
Twier’s original policy was limited to only including ads spon-
sored directly by federal candidates. However, Twier has since
expanded their policy to include: “(1) Ads that refer to an election
or a clearly identied candidate. (2) Ads that advocate for legisla-
tive issues of national importance. A clearly identied candidate
refers to any candidate running for federal, state, or local elec-
tion [30].” Based on our analysis, it appears that Twier is currently
not enforcing their policy well.
Sponsors’ Info. Facebook only displays a text string which the
sponsor provides and is intended to identify who is paying for the
ad. We went through the veing process of becoming a political
advertiser on Facebook’s platform. is entailed uploading a U.S.
identication card which was approved approximately ve minutes
later, at which time we could start posting political ads. Facebook
also validates the address of the advertiser by sending them a post
card which must be replied to within 30 days or else the advertiser
will be suspended. However, during this 30 day grace period politi-
cal advertisers can post ads without validating their address. We
disclosed to Facebook and a subsequent independent experiment
by Turton, a reporter from Vice news, showed that Facebook does
not currently vet this text string which allowed the reporter to post
ads appearing to be from U.S. Senators [27]. is is a security issue
that Facebook has acknowledged but claims there is no eective
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and scalable veing techniques [21]. We will describe the issues
that we found with this self-reported text string later in this paper.
Google provides both a text string and a Federal Election Candi-
date (FEC) ID or EIN (U.S. Tax ID) which is veed for every political
advertiser in their archive. Twier provides a text string and, when
available, the billing info of the political sponsors. Twier initially
did not vet this information but started veing sponsor’s EIN simi-
lar to Google on September 30th , 2018. Providing a consistent and
easy to reference identier such as FEC or EIN for each sponsor
enables us to beer study sponsors in Google and Twier’s archive.
ViewedAudience. Facebook and Twier both include break downs
on the impression viewing audience by gender, age range, and state
level geolocation. Google provides this information as a heat map
image that we cannot currently extract this information from for
our analysis thus wemark Google as “N/A” for this category. Google
has replied that they will work on releasing this information in a
format that we can analyze.
Targeting Info. Facebook does not include any explicit targeting
information in their archive. Google and Twier makes transparent
Age, gender, and geolocation based targeting but do not appear
to release other types of targeting criteria, such as audience and
content, which are allowed by their advertising platforms. Google
also makes transparent some aggregated keyword targeting data.
All of the platforms only release partial targeting information, at
best, which obscures a key facet of online political advertising.
Data Availability. Facebook initially only provided a keyword
based portal that was designed for small-scale interactive user ex-
ploration of the ads in the archive. Facebook enabled anti-scraping
functionality in July 2018 that makes it dicult to collect large-
scale data by scraping this portal. In September 2018 Facebook
released an API that is currently in beta testing which we have
access to aer signing an NDA stipulating that we will not publicly
release raw data collected from the API. is eectively means that
only a small set of U.S. organizations participating in the API beta
test have large-scale data collection access to ads in the Facebook
archive.
Twier has provided an open API and list of all accounts in-
cluded in their transparency archive which allows us to eectively
collect all ads included in their archive. Google implemented a
portal similar to Facebook’s and also releases a Bigery (SQL-like)
database of all the ads included in their archive which is updated
weekly. For our use case of large-scale data analysis this database
format is ideal.
3 DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY
3.1 Facebook
Initially we scraped Facebook’s archive using a list of keywords that
included elected positions (i.e., governor, judge, senator), U.S. state
names, and key political issues (i.e., health care, immigration, taxes).
Around the end of July 2018, Facebook implemented anti-scraping
measures which blocked our scraper. us, we had no viable means
of collecting large-scale ad data until Facebook implemented their
API in September 2018. We have publicly released a report and all
of the data that we collected by scraping Facebook’s archive user
portal before our scraper was blocked [17].
We are part of Facebook’s Political Ad Archive API beta test-
ing program [9] which allows us to query Facebook’s Political Ad
Archive for specic keyword terms which is matched against the
page name, the disclaimer, or ad text. Ads returned by Facebook’s
API are ordered using a proprietary ranking algorithm that was not
described to us how it functions. However, most advertisements
appear to be returned in chronological order. A single query to
Facebook’s API returns at most 1,000 ads and we can page through
to collect additional ads using pagination functionality as part of
the API. Currently there is a limitation in Facebook’s Political Ad
Archive API beta that prevents us from paging past 8,000 ads. is
is problematic because many searches will return far more than
8,000 results.
Information on spend and impressions per ad is only available
in broad ranges. For impressions, the ranges presented are: 0 - 999,
1,000 - 4,999, 5,000 - 9,999, 10,000 - 49,999, 50,000 - 99,999, 100,000 -
199,999, 200,000 - 499,999, 500,000 - 999,999. For spend, the ranges
presented are: 0 - 99, 100 - 499, 500 - 999, 1,000 - 4,999, 5,000 - 9,999,
10,000 - 49,999, 50,000 - 99,999, 100,000 - 199,999, 200,000 - 499,999,
500,000 - 999,999.
Additionally, the API has very low rate limits. We have found
that functionally, we could make at most 3 requests per minute
on average before hiing these rate limits. Our goal was to create
as comprehensive and representative a dataset as possible. Given
the very low rate limits and limits on the number of responses for
a given search, our approach was to search by advertising page
as much as possible in order to reduce the bias in our data. We
are currently able to keep up with the rate of new advertisements
appearing in Facebook’s political ad transparency archive. We
cannot publicly release the raw data that we have collected from
Facebook’s API due to the agreement that we have signed with
Facebook as a requirement for access to their API.
We created a separate approach for discovering pages that are
linked to sponsored political ads. Our approach to discovering
pages involved scraping Facebook’s Political Ad Archive user portal
interface. We chose a scraping method for page discovery since
our access to Facebook’s API is highly rate limited and it would
be logistically infeasible to perform the queries required for both
page discovery and to collect ads using our API access. Our list was
not a complete list of advertisers using Facebook’s platform since
it depends on good coverage based on our keyword searches.
Facebook started publishing a comprehensive list aer the cut-
o for our data analyzed in this study. Our data collection from
Facebook’s archive is our best eort and was incomplete based on
analysis of what is contained in Facebook’s transparency report.
We have changed our data collection methodology moving forward
to discover Facebook pages running political ads using Facebook’s
weekly transparency reports. is combined with improvements
we requested and Facebook implemented to their API aer the
data collection period for this study will improve our coverage to a
mostly complete set of U.S. political ads Facebook has included in
their transparency archive.
3.2 Google
Google published their archive as a public dataset in a Bigery
(SQL-like) format and commied to keeping it public. However, we
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observed that ad spend and impression values for ads, and occasion-
ally advertiser information were being changed aer their entry
into the archive. For this reason, we created separate archives of
the dataset on a weekly basis. Additionally, ad text information was
not available in the dataset itself, but was viewable at a summary
page for each ad. We scraped all of these associated pages to col-
lect ad text to be associated in our dataset with the underlying ad
data. Unfortunately, many of these summary pages did not render
correctly, so we were only able to collect ad text for approximately
66% of pages which contained it. Two separate issues prevented
collection. First, some ad pages display the message:
“Advertisers are able to use approved third party vendors to serve ads
on Google. While we are able to review these ads for compliance with
advertising policies, due to technical limitations, we are currently
unable to display the content of the ad in the Transparency Report.”
Second, some ad pages displayed the message:
“Policy violation is ad violated Google’s Advertising Policy.” We
recommend that Google change their implementation so that ads
served by third party vendors or which were deleted for compli-
ance reasons are still accessible through their transparency archive.
Google can place a click-through disclaimer to avoid accidental
exposure to policy violated content similar to what Facebook has
implemented for deleted advertisements.
Information on spend and impressions per ad are only available
in broad ranges. For impressions, the ranges presented are: ”¡= 10k”,
”10k-100k”, ”100k-1M”, ”1M-10M”, ”¿ 10M”. For spend, the ranges
presented are: ”¡ 100”, ”100-1k”, ”1k-50k”, ”50k-100k”, ”¿ 100k”.
e ads in this dataset are a combination of text-only ads that are
displayed alongside Google search results and image or video-only
ads that are displayed as banner or sidebar ads on Google’s AdSense
network.
In addition to per-ad data, Google also published some aggregate
data on a per-advertiser and geographic basis. One of these aggre-
gations was exact weekly spend per advertiser. roughout this
paper, we present minimum numbers for impressions and spend
because both Google and Facebook publish ranges for impressions
and spend for each ad, instead of exact numbers. ese total ag-
gregations, give us a sense of how much error there is when we
use these minimum estimates for Google. According to Google,
advertisers spent $45 M on political ads but our minimum estimate
of spending was only $11 M.
3.3 Twitter
Twier publishes a list of all political campaigning advertisers [28]
which we scrape daily to discover new political campaign advertis-
ers’ Twier accounts. In addition to this list provided by Twier,
we have also manually aempted to identify every federal election
candidates’ personal or campaign Twier account. We then query
each account daily using Twier’s API perform to collect updated
information on all promoted tweets and detect federal election
candidates which are not listed on Twier’s political campaigning
advertisers page but are sponsoring tweets. During our scraping,
we have noticed that some promoted tweets were deleted and are
replaced with the text:
“is Tweet is not available because it includes content that violated
Twier Ads Policies.”
e information for these deleted promoted tweets is no longer
accessible through Twier’s political transparency archive. How-
ever, if we have scraped them before they were deleted we have
retained the content and information about these promoted tweets.
We recommend that Twier change their implementation so that
promoted tweets which were deleted are still accessible through
their transparency archive. Twier can place a click-through dis-
claimer to avoid accidental exposure to policy violated content
similar to what Facebook has implemented for deleted advertise-
ments. We have made public all of the data that we have collected
from Twier’s transparency archive.
Additionally, we noted that there were several accounts of fed-
eral candidates that were not being archived according to Twier’s
policies. We would nd these ads during our regular scrapes for ads
by all federal candidates, but no billing or impression data would be
available, and the ads would disappear from Twier’s archive aer
7 days, as is typical for non-political ads. We notied Twier about
4 accounts which they subsequently added to their transparency
archive. However, Twier did not retroactively include their prior
promoted tweets from these accounts and there are currently 11
additional federal candidate accounts which have promoted tweets
not included in the archive. us, it appears that Twier’s pro-
cess for agging federal election candidates’ account that should
be included in their archive is not working correctly. We will dis-
close this new set of 11 accounts to Twier and continue to work
with them to improve their process for discovering and including
relevant promoted tweets in their transparency archive.
4 DATASETS
We have collected all of the U.S. political ad data that Google and
Twier have made transparent and archived as of October 21st ,
2018. In addition, we have made our best eort to collect as much
of the U.S. political ad data that Facebook has made transparent and
archived as of October 21st , 2018. For Facebook, we are not able
to collect all of the ad data from their transparency archive due to
the limitations in their API; this is a subset of U.S. political ads that
ran on Facebook. Note that our scraper was blocked by Facebook
in mid-July, 2018 and we were not able to collect data until the
beginning of September, 2018 when we began to use their beta API.
is means that we do not have good coverage of Facebook ads
during that period since it is dicult to retrieve older ads from
Facebook’s current beta API. On October 23rd, 2018, shortly aer
we froze our dataset, Facebook released their Ad Archive Report [6].
From this, we know that as of the cuto date for data analyzed in
this study, Facebook had a total of 1.67M ads in their archive, from
a total of 256M spent across 78K pages. We have captured over 75%
of all ads in the archive, but only 49% of the pages.
On the Facebook platform, ads that run without a ’Paid for by’
label but are later deemed to be political are removed from circula-
tion and added to the archive. We have been able to nd 96,106 such
ads in the archive, with a total spend of at least $42.8 million and
670 million impressions. It does not appear that Google or Twier
have any mechanism for retroactively marking an ad as political
if it is discovered aer the fact, and we would encourage them to
develop this capacity.
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Table 2 shows all of the data that we have collected from each
of the platforms. Most of the political ads in these archives are
from late May, 2018 to October 21st , 2018 but there are several
older ads from Twier and Facebook that have been included in
their transparency archives. Facebook has the most advertisers,
ads, impressions, and spend. However, Facebook also includes
many political issue ads in their transparency archive that are not
included in Google and Twier’s transparency archives so this is
not a fair comparison of political advertising activity across all
three platforms. An important dierence between the datasets
is that, while Facebook and Twier are publishing breakdowns
of impressions on geographic and demographic lines, Google is
instead publishing geographic and demographic targetings. ese
should not be considered equivalent. Below in the analysis section
we will present a more accurate comparison of political advertising
activity across all three platforms.
Additionally, we use a dataset published by ProPublica of political
ads that have been viewed by their users who have installed browser
extensions that automatically collected advertisements on their
Facebook pages and sent them to ProPublica’s servers [23]. Table 3
provides an overview of this dataset. We were able to connect ads
in the ProPublica dataset to ads in our dataset of archived political
ads by mapping the ad IDs used in the ProPublica dataset to the
ad archive IDs used in the archive. To do this, we scraped the
Facebook’s web-based political ad archive, as both the ad IDs and
ad archive ids were available. Each record in this dataset contains,
among other things, the text of the data, the various targetings
received by the dierent users who saw the ad, the page associated
with the ad, and the ’Paid by’ ad sponsor string associated with the
ad. Of the 33,308 ads in the ProPublica dataset with a creation date
aer May 7th , 2018, the ocial start of the Facebook dataset, we
were able to nd 18,010. Because the users who contribute data to
this dataset are self-selecting, these ads should not be considered
a representative sample of ads in the larger Facebook Ad Archive.
Among other things, the average ad spend on ads in this dataset
was $644, compared to $107 for the larger dataset.
As part of our analysis, we manually categorized the top adver-
tisers on all three platforms. We categorized these advertisers by
organization type (political candidate, Political Action Commiee
(PAC), Union, For Prot, etc). For Facebook, we were able to classify
the organizations of the advertisers who were responsible for at
least 75% of the total number of ads in the Facebook archive. For
Google, we labeled the organization of top advertisers who were
responsible for 80% of the total number of ads, and for Twier we
we were able to label all 88 advertisers with their organization type.
We were able to categorize 12,833 of the top ad sponsors. If we were
not able to categorize an advertiser, it is marked as ’Unknown’.
We also classied the ads themselves into 5 categories: Inform,
Connect, Donate, Move, or Commercial. Inform ads seek to per-
suade the viewer, but do not make an explicit ask. Connect ads seek
the user’s contact information. Donate ads seek the user’s money.
Move ads aempt to motivate the user to take some action in the
physical world, such as aending a rally or voting. Commercial ads
seek to sell the user goods or services. We classied the ads based
on the outgoing links from the ads. Ads that had no outgoing links
were always classied as Inform ads, as they could not have any fur-
ther ask from the user. Ads that linked directly third-party sites for
Figure 1: Distribution of ads by size
event management (eventbrite.com), contact management(Google
Docs), or payments management (actblue.com) were solely classi-
ed as Move, Connect, or Donate ads respectively. Ads that linked
to general campaign sites were usually multiple-classed as some
combination of the three, as these ads and pages typically made
multiple asks. Ads by For Prot Media organizations were classied
as Inform ads, as these advertisers do not sell goods or services
to users. Ads by For Prot organizations that linked to store sites
or sites selling services were classied as Commercial. We were
able to categorize 907,840 ads with these methods. Heavy use of
third-party service providers by advertisers was extremely helpful
in making these classications. If we were not able to categorize an
ad, it was marked as ’Unknown’. We validated this method of ad
categorization by taking a random sample of 300 categorized ads
from each platform and manually verifying them. e error rate for
Facebook was 4%, for Google was 3.7%, and for Twier was 3.7%
A limitation that applies to all our datasets is that we do not
know when the spend and impressions for each ad occurred during
the lifetime of the ad. Some ads run for several weeks and some for
only a day, but in either case, we aribute their entire spend and
total impressions to the creation date of the ad.
5 RESULTS
We calculate total spend and impression minimum and maximum
for Facebook ads by summing respectively the smallest and largest
value for the range given for each ad. For Google, advertiser weekly
spend data was aggregated for all advertisers, so we did not have to
estimate that number. For Twier, exact numbers for impressions
and spend were available, so no estimation was needed. We also
note that we are only able to collect a subset of political advertise-
ments from Facebook’s transparency archive due to accessibility
issues with their beta API. We stress that because the criteria for
inclusion in these archives diered on the dierent platforms, the
gures on relative proportions of ad types and advertiser types
should be seen as a reection of what the platforms chose to make
transparent in addition to what is organically present on these
platforms.
With that in mind, we can see clear dierences between the
platforms. Of particular note is the dierence in ad size visible in
Figure 1, with Facebook having a much larger sized share of the
smallest size of ad. Also of note is the diering prevalence of types
of advertisers in Figure 3, with PACs making up a much larger
percentage of spend on Google compared with the other platforms.
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Platform Total Ads Total Sponsors Total Pages Impressions Spend First Ad Date Last Ad Date
Facebook 1.26 M 24 K 38 k 7.35 B - 21.12 B $135 M - $567 M July 14th , 2014 October 21st , 2018
Google 41 K 616 NA 1.3 B - 11.6 B $45 M May 31st, 2018 October 21st , 2018
Twier 1808 88 NA 118 M $1.6 M December 21st , 2016 October 21st , 2018
Table 2: Overall Datasets
Total Ads 81,052
Total Pages 2,363
Total Ad Sponsors 2395
Earliest Ad Date July 31st, 2017
Latest Ad Date October 18th, 2018
Table 3: ProPublica Political Advertisements From Face-
book
Figure 2: Distribution of ads by type
Figure 3: Distribution of spend by advertiser type
5.1 Data Over Time
e time period during which we were collecting data coincided
with the 2018 midterm elections in the United States. us, we were
able to observe changing paerns in spend leading up to a major
election. Figure 4 shows spend by week for the 5 month period
leading up to the election and Figure 5 shows raw ad count for
the same period. We note that our data, particularly for Facebook
spend, is right-censored for the nal two weeks. is is caused
by Facebook’s API limitations which only enable us to be able
to recheck ad spends weekly. us, newly create ads have likely
Results Facebook Google Twier
Total Advertisers 1 K 534 54
Total Ads 161 K 15 K 1 K
Total Impressions 800 M - 2.4 B 280 M- 3 B 100 M
Total USD Spend $12 M - $60 M $13.5 M $1.4 M
Ave Impressions/Ad 5 K - 15 K 32 K - 283 K 65 K
Ave USD Spend/Ad $74 - $373 $1 K $885
Table 4: Federal Candidate Only Results
not spent much of their budget when we initially discover them.
is right censor eect also likely eects Google and Twier to a
lesser degree due to ads with larger budgets that take several days
to spend down completely. is can be corrected by periodically
rechecking the ads until they have all spent their budgets which is
normally within a week. If the paper is accepted, we will update
the data to include ads up to the U.S. midterm elections.
We can see the expected increases in the number of ads on
all three platforms as the U.S. midterm elections approach. On
Facebook’s platform there is an increase in connect ads and on
Twier there is an increase in move ads. Both of these are related
to sophisticated “get out the vote” eorts that many groups have
deployed. ese move ads include images which include specic
polling place addresses and websites that provide polling place
directions and information. e connect ads oen provide users
with instructions on how they can volunteer to help with early and
day-of voter turnout eorts. e cause of the spending spikes for
Facebook’s platform can be aributed to a few unknown sponsors
that we could not link to a legally registered entity but that were
likely quasi for-prot advertisers which we will discuss further
later in the paper. e spending spikes on Twier’s platform can
be aributed to candidates who ran a few ads with larger budgets.
5.2 Federal Candidate Comparison
In order to understand how political advertising across these plat-
forms dier, we aempted to create a comparable subset of adver-
tisers and ads. is is dicult because each platform has slightly
dierent criteria for inclusion. To do this, we present results for
advertising only paid for by candidates for federal oce, which
was the broadest set that was reliably included in all three archives.
Note, this does not include ads by current oceholders who are not
seeking re-election or ads that merely mention a federal candidate
but are paid for by another party. Results for these advertisers are
presented in Table 4.
Table 4 shows that Facebook is the platform with the broadest
appeal to federal candidate advertisers, with far more advertisers
and ads than Google. However, political advertising by this group
on Google appears to generate more spend and possibly more im-
pressions than ads on Facebook. e average ad size on Facebook
in terms of impressions and spend are the smallest based on our
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Figure 4: Platform Ad Count By Ad Type By Week
Figure 5: Platform Spend By Advertiser Type By Week
Figure 6: Federal Candidate ads by Size
Figure 7: Federal Candidate Spend by Ad Type
minimum estimates indicating that advertisers are running smaller,
likely more targeted ads on Facebook. ese small ads on Face-
book are what are called micro targeted, which we dene as less
than 1,000 impressions or a spend of less than $100. For Facebook,
microtargeted ads make up 81% of the overall number of ads for
federal candidates in our dataset. For Twier, this number is 62%,
and for Google it is 54%. Figure 6 shows the share of ads by size
of spend, and here we can begin to see how federal candidates use
these platforms in dierent ways. We note that the distribution of
ads by size for federal candidates in Figure 6 is very similar to the
overall distribution of ads by size seen in Figure 1.
Figure 7 shows the relative spend on dierent ad platforms,
where we see very dierent percentages for types of ads. Commer-
cial ads are not shown in this gure because there were too few
commercial ads to be visible. Particularly of note is the fact that ads
seeking donations were far more common on the Google platform,
and ads seeking to spread a message (’Inform’) were much more
common on Facebook.
Seeing these dierences in both ad size and the types of ads that
were run, we wanted to understand if advertisers were trying to
reach dierent geographic audiences with dierent types of ads.
To do this, we compared the number of regions in which various
ads had impressions on Facebook and Twier, and the number of
regions targeted for Google. Figure 8 shows that a variation in
targeting strategy is visible on Facebook and Twier. On Facebook,
’Move’ ads that encouraged people to aend a rally, volunteer for
a candidate, or some other in-person activity were viewed, on
average, in 4 regions, while ’Donate’ ads were viewed in 24 regions
on average. is makes a certain amount of intuitive sense; people
are willing to travel only so far to aend a rally, but can donate to
candidates anywhere in the United States.
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Figure 8: CDF of Regions by Ad Type for Federal Candidates
5.3 Ad Targeting
One of the deciencies with the Facebook political ad archive is
that while it does share geographic and demographic information
about who saw a particular ad, we have no way of knowing how
that ad was targeted. However we were able to connect our dataset
containing information about who consumed ads with one pub-
lished by ProPublica, which contains some data about how ads were
targeted. e ProPublica data was collected by a browser plugin
operated by ProPublica which anyone can install. ProPublica’s
browser plugin [22] uses a supervised Natural Language Process-
ing (NLP) classier to detect political ads in addition to allowing
users to manually classify ads they see as political. e browser
plugin then collects the partial ad targeting explanations Facebook
provides by automatically clicking on the “Why am I seeing this?”
buon for political ads and sends it to ProPublica for them to make
public.
We rst provide a brief background on Facebook targeting audi-
ence options [34]. Facebook exposes prospective advertisers to a
plethora of options. First, advertisers can target users based on age,
gender, location and languages they speak. Second, advertisers can
choose to send their ads to users in a custom audience or lookalike
audience. Custom audiences contain a list of identiers of specic
users. Advertisers can use various types of data to create a custom
audience list, ranging from specifying the emails, phone numbers
or physical addresses of people they want to reach, to users that
have visited their website, installed their mobile application, or
liked their Facebook Page. Lookalike audiences allow advertisers to
let Facebook choose to whom to sends their ads based on previous
campaigns. Finally, advertisers can choose from a long list of target-
ing aributes the characteristics they want users who receive their
ads to have (e.g., users interested in Catholic Church). Targeting
aributes are categorized in types such as demographics, behaviors
and interests. Advertisers can choose multiple aributes, to target.
A prior study by Athanasioshas, et al. [2] reverse engineered
what Facebook chooses to show and the limitations of the ad tar-
geting explanation Facebook provides. is study showed that ad
explanations are incomplete; each explanation, shows at most one
targeting aribute (plus age/gender/location information), regard-
less of how many aributes the advertisers use. is means that
explanations reveal only part of the targeting aributes that were
used, providing us – and the users – with an incomplete picture of
Figure 9: ProPublica Spend by Ad Type
the aributes that advertisers were using. However, in the same
study, authors performed a number of controlled experiments that
suggest – but not conclusively prove – that there is a logic behind
which aributes appear in an explanation and which do not. Given
a targeting audience A obtained from two aributes a1 and a2, if a1
and a2 come from dierent aribute categories (e.g. Demographic,
Behavior, Interest, etc.), the aribute shown follows a specic prece-
dence (Demographics and Age/Gender/Location ¿ Interests ¿ PII
based lists ¿ Behaviors). If a1 and a2 come from the same aribute
category, the one that appears in the explanation is the one with
the highest estimated audience size. is will result in a systematic
under-counting of lower priority targeting types.
ere are two main sources of biases and limitations in ProP-
ublica’s dataset. One comes from users that installed ProPublica’s
plugin and which political ads they were shown. Another is from
the way Facebook provides ad explanations. e ProPublica dataset
is the only publicly available source of targeting information for
Facebook political ads. us, we present these results to provide an
initial insight into how Facebook political advertisers are targeting
their ads with the understanding of likely biases and limitations.
With these caveats in mind, we proceed to an analysis of the
18,010 ads which we were able to connect between the ProPublica
dataset and ours. In Figure 9, we see that dierent types of ads
do indeed rely on dierent targeting strategies. Of particular note
is the the divergence of ’Commercial’ ads, of which 74% rely on
targeting by interest groups, and of ’Donate’ ads, of which only 24%
do. e average ad size did not dier signicantly between targeting
types, but was signicantly larger than the average for the Facebook
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Figure 10: ProPublica Targeting by Advertiser Type
archive as a whole. We believe this to be an artifact of the collection
mechanism, which is biased toward nding larger ads. 91% of
ads in the overall ProPublica dataset had some kind of geographic
targeting, and 92% had age or gender targeting. On average, ads
in this dataset had on average 4.1 dierent targeting parameters,
so for Facebook these should be thought of as a minimum criteria.
By contrast, 58% of ads in the Google archive had no geographic
targeting whatsoever and 70% had neither age nor gender targeting.
In Figure 10, we also see diverging strategies between advertisers,
with Political Candidates and PACs making heavy use of custom
lists of users and For Prot and For Prot Media companies relying
far more on targeting users by their interests. Campaigns have
numerous potential sources from which to compile lists of users.
In addition to their own lists of donors and voter rolls, campaigns
can rent lists from other candidates [15].
Both Google and Twier oer advertisers similar targeting cri-
teria to what we have described for Facebook, including custom
audiences and lookalike audiences. Both even allow targeting of
users based on interests, although they infer these interests in dier-
ent ways. Both havemade transparent demographic and geographic
targeting information for ads in their archive, but without other
targeting information, this is an incomplete picture at best. We
encourage Google and Twier to at minimum follow Facebook’s
example and make transparent to users information about why
they have been targeed for ads that they are seeing.
5.4 New Types of Political Advertisers
5.4.1 For-Profit Media. One advertiser type in particular proved
to be an interesting outlier. e category ’For Prot Media’ con-
tains advertisers whose ads are not considered traditional news by
Facebook (those ads are in a separate part of the archive that we
did not include) but have content intended solely to entertain or
sway the opinion of the viewer. Over the Facebook dataset as a
whole, the average ad sponsor ran ads on 1.6 pages. Advertisers
in the for-prot media category however, ran ads on 3.2 pages on
average. We have examined many of these for-prot media compa-
nies to understand why they are running across many Facebook
pages. What we have found in numerous instances is unknown
for-prot media companies that appear to be creating disingenuous
communities that appear to be “grassroots movements” to target
dierent demographics and interests with a combination of paid
and organic political messaging.
A good example of this type of advertiser is ”New American
Media Group LLC”. is ad sponsor ran le leaning ads on 10
dierent pages. ese pages were designed to appeal to dierent
demographics (”Melanin” for people of color, ”e Soldier Network”
for Veterans, ”Raising Tomorrow” for parents, etc.) but oen run the
same content on multiple pages. While this LLC has an extremely
similar name to a now-defunct genuine le-leaning media outlet
(New America Media), it appears to have no connection to that
prior group, and also appears to have no activity o of Facebook.
While some advertisers in this category were fairly traditional
entertainment websites (i.e., Comedy Central), some were “for-
prot” companies in name only that appeared to exist for no other
purpose other than to spread a particular political message and had
no way of generating an actual prot. We also discovered “News
for Democracy” is an LLC that ran le leaning ads on 14 dierent
Facebook pages most of which were designed to be appealing to
groups with traditionally conservative view points, such as “e
Holy Tribune.” Journalists investigated this LLC and linked it to
MotiveAI which is a liberal political advertising company.
5.4.2 Corporate Astroturfing. Corporations paying for political
advertising is not an entirely new phenomenon and has traditionally
been funded through industry trade groups and PACs. However,
the reporting requirements by the FCC for U.S. political advertising
on television oen made this political messaging traceable to the
real sponsor. ese stricter reporting requirements do not apply to
online political advertising and the ad-hoc reporting requirements
that online platforms have enacted are being abused by corporations
and industry trade groups to undo transparency eorts.
We discovered in our analysis 355 ads sponsored by “Citizens for
Tobacco Rights” which is not a registered company in the U.S. but
does disclose on their website and Facebook page that it is operated
by cigaree company Philip Morris. However, someone who only
saw the Facebook ad disclaimer would not be able to connect the
ads to Philip Morris without further investigation. Other journalists
have found instances of oil and insurance lobbying groups that also
provided sponsor names that did not match the legally incorporated
entity sponsoring the ads [21]. ese organizations are seemingly
taking advantage of Facebook’s policy of not veing sponsor names
since some of these entities also ran political ads on Google’s ad
platform but provided Google with their EIN (tax ID) and correct
legally incorporated names of their organizations [21].
5.5 Discussion
e dierent policies, bugs, idiosyncrasies, and security weaknesses
of each transparency archive implementation present challenges to
our analysis eorts. We nd many of the issues with these archives
likely stem from a combination of their hasty creation and the fact
that the platforms are still working out how to improve security of
these archives such they are dicult to deceive or evade. We will
rst discuss issues related to accidentally or intentionally deceiving
these transparency eorts and how they might be improved by
implementing more robust sponsor aribution techniques. e sec-
ond part of our discussion will focus on issues related to bypassing
inclusion into the dierent platforms’ archives and what can be
done to improve these issues.
5.5.1 Sponsor Aribution. e for-prot political advertisers ap-
pear to be the ones that are accidental or intentionally skirting and
violating the spirit of online transparency sponsorship disclosure
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policies. As we discussed in the Ad Targeting section, it’s extremely
easy for groups such as ’New American Media’ to obscure who
they actually are from users and researchers.
It is worth noting that such advertising by for-prot corpora-
tions was not legal until the Citizens United Supreme Court decision
in 2010 [1] that struck down restrictions on election spending by
for-prot corporations. However, political messaging advertisers
who run ads on television or radio stations governed by the FCC
must still report the name and contact information of the busi-
ness which paid for the ad, including the company’s ocers and
directors. Such data is published by the FCC in a public database.
Political advertisers who send direct mail through the U.S. Postal
Service (USPS) must also report their activities through the FEC
with similar public disclosure of the name and contact information
of the business. e regulations that require such disclosure for ads
that mention candidates do not apply to online advertising, largely
because the laws that mandate such public disclosures were draed
before these platforms were as ubiquitous as they have become.
What this means in practice though, is that people who want
to publicize a political message can form a for-prot company for
doing so with no intent of making an prot. As a private company,
they do not need to publicly disclose their investors in the way
that PACs are required to disclose their donors. en, the for-prot
company can advertise on social media, also without disclosing the
legal entity providing the funds to pay for the ad.
On Facebook’s platform, advertisers can easily mislead when
providing the ’ad sponsor’ string associated with their ads, either
intentionally or accidentally. us, it is eectively free to circum-
vent Facebook’s transparency implementation. We see numerous
instances on Facebook’s platforms of this occurring. Sometimes, the
unreliability of the ad sponsor label appeared to be caused purely
by human error, such as typos or variation during data entry. For
example, Donald J. Trump For President, Inc. sponsored ads on
both the Donald J. Trump page and the Mike Pence page. However,
when sponsoring ads on the Donald J. Trump page, the organiza-
tion is known as ’Donald J. Trump For President, Inc’ and when
sponsoring ads on the Mike Pence page, is known as ’Donald J.
Trump For President, Inc.’. Facebook has not publicly stated plans
to implement additional veing of political sponsors. Facebook’s
argument is that anything they might implement for additional vet-
ting would not be scalable because of their broader inclusion policy
which extends to political issue ads [21]. However, this has cre-
ated a weakness in Facebook’s transparency implementation that
greatly diminishes its eectiveness for studying dishonest political
advertisers.
Google and Twier both vet sponsors so companies must either
reveal their legally incorporated name, pay existing third-parties
to create ads on their behalf, or create shell organizations (i.e., LLC,
PACs). We should note that we see instances of political ads on
Facebook and Twier where the sponsor is a third-party advertising
agency instead of the actual entity that paid for the ads. is is an
example of the complexities of correctly aributing political ads
to the real sponsors. It is clear from analysis that we need more
discussion about how to implement sponsorship disclosure and
veing in a way that makes it practical to deploy at scale and more
dicult to circumvent.
5.5.2 Transparency Infrastructure. As we have noted, we ap-
preciate the speed with which these transparency archives were
created. However, the lack of full integration of these archives into
the broader ad platforms of these companies is currently hurting
the ecacy of these transparency eorts.
We believe that there are ads on the Google and Twier platforms
that would be considered political content that are not included
in their transparency archives because their criteria for inclusion
are too narrow or their mechanisms for nding this content are
insucient. More research needs to be done into exactly what
the general population considers to be political advertising. We
would encourage these platforms to create policies and enforcement
mechanisms that will make transparent advertising content that
the general population would consider political.
We also encountered several technical and policy issues with
the archives as they currently exist. Many ads, particularly in the
Google archive, were missing content information. Information on
spend and impressions were only available in broad ranges from
Facebook and Google. No targeting information or very lile target-
ing information was available from any of the platforms. Facebook
required us to sign an NDA that prohibited us from sharing our raw
data even with other researchers or even discussing our ndings
directly with non- U.S. Persons.
We call on these organizations to re-architect their platforms and
policies to support full transparency of all political ads. We realize
that making the changes we recommend will require investment of
time and money both in the technology of these platforms and the
corporate culture of the organizations that own them.
6 RELATEDWORK
6.1 Online Advertising
Korolova [16] was the rst to point out privacy aacks based on
micro-targeted online ads. Followup work has reverse-engineered
the targeting options provided by major online ad networks [33]
and explored privacy [2] and bias [26] issues of these online ad
networks. ere has also been work on designing improved ad
transparency mechanisms [20]. For our study, we leverage this
prior work on reverse-engineering online advertising networks’
targeting options and how Facebook’s ad targeting explanation
likely is implemented.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no systematic
analysis of online advertisers to this point likely due to the diculty
of collecting large-scale data from online ad networks [13]. One of
the only prior large-scale quantitative studies of online advertisers
focused on how their strategies eected conversion rates based on
aggregate analysis of advertisers on Microso’s ad network [32].
XRay [18] and Sunshine [19] are two techniques that were created
to detect and infer online ad targeting methods. However, these
were proof of concept systems and not deployed at large-scale. An
initial analysis of Facebook’s proposed ad transparency archive
implementations pointed out the issue of only including political
ads and not revealing targeting information [31]. is report was
released before Facebook implemented their transparency archive
and therefor did not analyze the ad data archived by Facebook or
issues with the actual implementation. We have conducted the rst
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large-scale analysis of online political advertising based on the data
recently made transparent by Facebook, Google, and Twier.
6.2 Political Advertising
Analysis of political television ads has been the focus of most prior
political advertising studies likely due to this data being publicly
published by the FCC and easy to access [14, 35]. ere is at least
one prior study that explored the inuence of political television
ads on online discussion [25]. ere have also been studies of inves-
tigating the polarization of online political discourse [3, 10]. e
closest related to our study is a prior study which showed that
uploading political video advertisements to YouTube generated un-
paid organic-views and improved their eectiveness [24]. However,
to the best of our knowledge ours is the rst large-scale study of
online political advertising.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We have performed an analysis of the ads that we were able to
collect from Facebook, Google, and Twier’s transparency archives
related to U.S. politics. Based on the data we collected, we provide
an initial understanding and taxonomies of online political advertis-
ing strategies for both honest and possibly dishonest U.S. political
advertisers. We also point out limitations and weaknesses of the
policies and current implementations of these archives. As part of
our analysis, we demonstrate how advertisers are intentionally or
accidentally deceiving and bypassing these political transparency
archives. We provide a concrete list of suggestions that would
likely make them more robust and useful for enabling a beer un-
derstanding of political advertising. We are actively working with
each archive product teams to improve their implementations.
We commend Facebook, Google and Twier for their eorts so
far in improving transparency into political advertising on their
platforms. We note the speed with which these archives were
made available aer public concern about this issue was raised, and
that these transparency eorts have improved a great deal in the
short time that these tools have been available. We encourage the
platforms to continue to improve.
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